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ABSTRACT 
Fuzzy set matrix operations in the form of a computer-aided decision tool are 
applied to the management problem of aggregating assessments upward through 
successive layers of a hierarchy. The particular problem addressed concerns the 
production of a worldwide assessment of military command and control at the 
global level based on an assessment of capabilities three hierarchical levels below. 
The program works directly with colors indicating the operational readiness state o f  
the capability. Linguistic variables form a large portion of the data base. Extensive 
capability exists to link the global assessment with stored information on budgetary 
decisions identified by the software. The fuzzy set approach described is new in the 
defense community. The article provides an overview of the methodology and is not 
a detailed iscussion. 
KEYWORDS: Fuzzy sets; fuzzy aggregation; decision support systems; 
military program assessment; automation of. approximate reasoning 
INTRODUCTION 
It is almost 20 years since Bellman and Zadeh published their watershed 
article entitled "Decision Making in a Fuzzy Environment" in Journal o f  
Management Science [1]. Although it is difficult not to accompany the 
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statement with a wry smile, the Pentagon truly has aspects of a fuzzy decision- 
making environment. Extremely serious and complex decisions must be made on 
information that contains a mixture of fact and inference. Moreover, the 
importance of informed military judgment must not be gainsaid espite the fact 
that it may contain strong subjective lements. 
Problems arise when data and judgments from multiple sources must be 
combined to produce some kind of overall assessment. Automating such a 
procedure is beset with pitfalls because conventional pproaches make precious 
little allowance for subjectivity in either the data or the judgment. The ultimate 
solution is probably some kind of expert system. However, short of that kind of 
investment, we have developed a decision support ool for personal computers 
with color monitors. The tool is based on fuzzy set logic operations that directly 
address the combination of data and judgment when each has a strong subjective 
element. Moreover, much of the data is expressed linguistically in terms of 
colors running from green through yellow to red. 
A familiarity with fuzzy set theory is presumed in what follows; otherwise a 
thorough, albeit terse, introduction may be found in duBois and Prade [2]. On 
the other hand, because readers may be unfamiliar with either the OJCS or its 
associated decision-making environment, we first digress to introduce these two 
elements, in order to establish a perspective on the breadth and depth of the 
analysis reported here. Readers should bear in mind that this paper is an 
overview of a software tool designed to operate in a complicated ecision 
environment. Also, although the program works on real world data, some small 
liberties have been taken in order to construct nonsensitive examples. 
This application iswithout precedent inthe defense analytical community. We 
are also unaware of any other such extensive computer solution to a like problem 
elsewhere. The closest may be a solution to the problem of establishing credit 
worthiness of bank customers which was done for the German banking system 
[3]. 
A WORD ABOUT THE OJCS 
The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) is an office within the 
structure of the Department of Defense. It is composed of the chiefs of each of 
the four major service elements (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) plus a 
chairman. Their purview is high-level joint service problems arising from 
interfacing the various branches of the armed forces in various defined mission 
areas. In addition to the classical staff divisions of Personnel (J1), Intelligence 
(Defense Intelligence Agency [J2]), Operations (.13), and Logistics (J4), the 
OJCS has elements arising from their mission statement. One of these is 
Command, Control and Communications Division, which has again become J6 
in the reorganization mandated by Congress in 1986. It is the C3 arm of the 
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OJCS with which we will be concerned. The OJCS deals with ten functional or 
territorial headquarters, each of which is headed by a Commander-in-Chief 
(CINC). In this paper we shall refer rather loosely to the ten commands as 
theatres or CINCs interchangeably. 
For purposes of this paper, command and control (C2) by itself will be 
defined as those configurations of people, processes, and equipment through 
which the armed forces are directed. Add communications to command and 
control and you have C3. The whole of C3 is infrastructure, and it is notoriously 
difficult to evaluate; it really can be judged only through its effect on other 
things. Results can only be inferred by what C3 causes others to do and/or 
prevents them from doing. Since the OJCS deals at a national strategy level, 
often far removed from the final implementation f its decision, assessment of
C3 is rendered even more difficult. 
PENTAGON DECISION MAKING 
Decision making in the Pentagon is driven largely by something called the 
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). It is a complex and 
confusing two-year cycle of goal identification and subsequent requirements 
generation that ends with budget specification. Its output forms the basis of 
procurement decisions. The whole process is marked by the appearance of 
various key documents with names like Joint Strategic Planning Document, Joint 
Program Assessment Memorandum, and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The 
process of producing these documents is highly iterative and in a state of 
constant flux. It would be safe to identify it as an exercise in approximate 
reasoning, albeit not in any formal sense. The closest organizational theory 
might be management byobjectives. 
Among the more difficult items to track in the PPBS cycle are those military 
items related to infrastructure, since their ultimate justification depends upon the 
degree to which they facilitate the primary weapons of war. Perhaps the most 
difficult items to follow are those connected with C3. Classical operations 
research techniques for evaluation are generally defeated because of the combina- 
torics generated by all the possible combat outcomes that can result from varying 
the C3 infrastructure. 
At some point in the PPBS cycle the need arises to translate national goals for 
the military into objectives for C3 support. That translation eventually results in 
a listing of capabilities associated with the C3 support of defense. These 
capabilities must hen be evaluated theatre by theatre. The task then evolves into 
the problem of aggregating the evaluations so as to give a picture at the national 
level of the degree to which C3 supports the national defense goals. 
Before embarking upon the actual aggregation process, which forms the 
substance ofthis report, it was necessary to do considerable initial analysis of the 




Figure 1. Decision Cycle Analyzed. (Stippled blocks are the decision functions for 
which the fuzzy set based software was written.) 
in-place decision processes. Figure 1 may be helpful in understanding the whole 
process. Thus, we had to 
9 Isolate the C3 performance assessment process from the PPBS cycle 
9 Understand a totally manual process 
9 Split off the process of identifying needed military C3 capabilities (starting 
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from PPBS goals) from the subsequent assessment of those goals--which is
based on the same capabilities! 
9 Perform an end-to-end analysis to eliminate needless teps 
9 Program the aggregation steps using fuzzy sets algorithms 
We may summarize the decision universe as we found it, once isolated from the 
PPBS: 
9 The process was a manual collection of ill-defined heuristics, which were 
used in a nonuniform fashion to produce an assortment of high-level 
judgments that could not be supported at the detail level. 
9 The data were a heterogeneous admixture of fact and opinion in a variety of 
formats. 
With the foregoing preamble complete, we turn to a more detailed problem 
statement. 
FORMAL PROBLEM DEFINITION 
In some respects the entire OJCS is quintessentially a C3 organization. 
However, quite apart from that aspect, the C3 branch is concerned with the 
mechanics of the C3 process as it applies to multiservice endeavors. Among its 
requirements is one which mandates a periodic update at a global/national level 
on the state of affairs within the various C3 support areas. As we have said, 
automating the assessment procedures associated with this update is the subject 
of this contribution. Simply stated, the assessment is to be a report card on the 
question: How well does C3 support the national defense for four different states 
of armed conflict? These states run from peacetime, through the kind of tension 
associated with something like a hijacking, all the way to nuclear conflict. Two 
budgetary horizons are involved as well. We will argue that this decision making 
which accompanies the C3 assessment a the national level may be an archetype 
of approximate r asoning. 
Displayed in Figure 2 are the four hierarchical levels associated with the 
assessment procedure. Broad arrows indicate the direction of aggregation. The 
horizontal arrow (step 2) is discussed later. There are eight such structures: one 
for each of the four conflict states combined with the two budgetary horizons. 
Each set of hierarchical levels has the following components: 
9 At the lowest level are the capabilities of equipment and procedures and 
organizational units that satisfy military requirements forC3 support. They 
are grouped into sets of varying length that support further hierarchical 
level substructure. 
9 At the next level up, sets of these capabilities contribute to various missions 
in one of four C3 functional areas: monitoring, deciding, executing, and 
sometimes reconstitution (of forces) shown schematically by the vertical 
bars for each mission. 
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(ONE SET PER MISSION 
SUB-LEVEL: SEE F1G 3) 
CI : INDIVIDUAL C 3 
SUPPORT CAPABILITY 
Figure 2. Basic Four-Level Hierarchical Structure (Capabilities --* Missions ---* 
Theatres --* Global) (This illustration is one of a total of eight such level diagrams: one 
for each of four warfighting environments combined with two budgetary horizons. 
Arrows show direction of the aggregation.) 
* In turn, at the third level up, sets of  missions contribute to the support and 
definition for theatres of operation. As already stated, some of these 
theatres are defined geographically, for example, Europe (EUCOM), While 
others are defined functionally, for example, REDCOM (Readiness 
Command). Each of the theatres has a CINC from whose staff ultimately 
come the input assessment data. 
9 Finally, performance over the 10 theatres or CINCs worldwide produces a
Fuzzy Approach/Aggregating Military Assessment 257 
global assessment of the degree to which C3 supports the ability of the 
armed forces to defend the nation. 
Note again that the mission level is indicated by schematic vertical bars. Each 
bar is further subdivided into sublevels of intensity that can be associated with a 
conflict. For example, the lowest intensity could be an enemy that is only 
making threats. Eventually one passes to actual contact, and then to more lethal 
weapons. The number of conflict intensity sublevels may run from three or four 
to six. 
Because the presence of level substructure, the aggregation proeess from 
mission to theatre level is not at all straightforward. First the mission functions 
must be combined. We have dictated that all mission subfunctions for a 
particular mission share the same conflict intensity substructure. This facilitates 
the lateral combination--arrow 2 in Figure 2. However, the conflict intensity 
sublevels for the theatre are, in general, not  the same as those for the mission. In 
going from mission to theatre, sublevels of a mission may be "chunked" 
together in the aggregation process leading to a single theatre conflict intensity 
sublevel. Thus, it may take two or three intensity sublevels of a mission to 
provide the aggregated support to one conflict intensity sublevel of a theatre. See 
Figure 3 for a detail of the mission sublevel structure where five sublevels have 
been arbitrarily displayed. 
As one proceeds up the hierarchy, the reasoning becomes more and more 
approximate. Whereas judgments at the lowest level may still be close to 
measurable achievements like the ability to sense movement more than 30 km 
beyond a front, much more subjective lements enter higher up. Thus, at the 
second or mission level, the geography plays a major role. For example, the 
Pacific Command (PACOM) deals with vast open spaces of water, while 
EUCOM operates over a continental land mass. Although these two theatres 
may include the same mission in their aggregated definition, the way in which in 
the mission is perceived can be quite different. One such case could be air 
defense. By the time the third or theatre level is reached, such external decision 
components as risk assessment and political estimates enter directly. 
THE IDENTIFICATION OF A FUZZY PROCESS 
The decision to use fuzzy set and approximate reasoning paradigms was 
driven by the nature of the input to the aggregation process at the capability 
level, which is the lowest lying of the four levels in Figure 2. This input is a 
characterization f the degree to which a C3 capability is judged operationally 
ready to support a military mission or an element in a mission. An example of 
this type of capability might be the ability of a sensor system to " look" more 
than 100 km, or the ability of a processing center to prepare and transmit 
detailed military orders within, say, 10 minutes of tasking. Many attempts have 
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Detail of Mission Substructure Showing Conflict Intensity Sublevels. 
been made to quantify such abilities, usually in terms of numbers related to the 
physical processes associated with equipment used in the field for C3, such as 
telephones, computers, and networks. The resultant data are then considered to 
have been objectively gathered. Subsequent processing is usually subjective. 
We have identified an alternative paradigm based on fuzzy sets. If fuzzy sets 
are introduced, then we can gather subjective input data but process them 
according to well-defined mathematical operations. With a view to the future, 
we were also aware that a fuzzy treatment would permit goals and constraints'to 
be treated in the same decision space. This could be very useful for building a 
tool to aid in approximate reasoning, as decision makers were observed to 
regularly mix goals and constraints in their arguments. We elected, therefore, to 
base a computer code on fuzzy set logic. 
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FUZZY DATA GATHERING 
Possibilities 
Another approach to data collection about capabilities, and one that does not 
depend on numerical measurement, is possible. Such an approacfi is the one on 
which the decision aid described in this paper is based. This approach directly 
utilizes the theatre commander's military judgment of the degree to which the C3 
capability under discussion supports his mission. This is a subjective valuation 
of considerable merit that may be conventionally expressed by color. Generally, 
green is good capability, and red is bad. We treat the colors as linguistic 
variables in a fuzzy set. We then solicit as input the possibility that the defined 
capability is one of seven colors in the spectrum, operationally defined as 
follows: 








The capability is so good it enhances other capabilities. 
The capability meets all requirements. 
Less than full operability. 
Limited operability. 
Minimal operability. 
The capability fails to meet he requirement. 
Capability is so lacking that other capabilities are hindered. 
Then, for each national defense posture, for each theatre or CINC, and for each 
mission and subfunction within the mission by conflict intensity level, the 
possibility that a C3 capability will support he mission is obtained according to 
the defined color scheme. Point membership function values are used internally 
for each color-capability combination. However, since our users seem more 
comfortable with the range of numbers 0 to 100, we use percent possibility as 
input. Such a response might then generate the following sample possibility 
distributions, where dashes indicate no response (zero percent possibility). 
Capability SG GR Y/G Yel R/Y Red SR 
Ability to Look 30 km --  - -  40 60 75 40 -- 
Send Message in 5 Min -- 80 30 . . . .  
Since these are possibility distributions, their internal representation need not 
sum to unity according to the governing fuzzy set rules. 
These possibility distributions form one cornerstone of our program data 
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base. Associated with all capabilities that are not green is a reference to some 
deficiency and perhaps to some corrective action. [Eventually the program 
should also relate to the cost of the corrective action(s)--an associated 
approximate reasoning problem in itself which we tend to call the portfolio 
construction problem.] 
Linguistic Variables 
Having decided upon a color possibility distribution, the next step is to solicit 
the degree to which the next hierarchical level up depends upon the stated 
capability. Linguistic variables are again used. The user is asked to form a set of 
dependencies--linguistic variables with corresponding membership function 
values. Such a set may look like the following: 
(NO-DEPENDENCEI0.1, SOME-CONNECTIONI0.25, 
MODERATE-IMPORTANCE[ 0.4, HIGHLY-IMPORTANTI0.7 ,
ESSENTIALI0.85) 
Not that the variable "essential" is not equal to unity nor is "no dependence" 
equal to zero. The values assigned in this example may be thought of as hedging 
of a sort. Future versions of the software will be designed to infer the 
membership values from elicited responses, as we currently find that the users 
are able to "game" the software through artful choices of membership value 
assignments for the linguistically chosen variables. This choice is intuitively 
based since the mechanisms of the aggregation (covered later) are unknown (or 
"transparent") to the user. The user seems to be able to detect patterns in the 
answers resulting from dominance of either dependency values or color 
possibility distributions. 
The final step in the input process is to link the first two hierarchical levels by 
having a user assign a dependency variable to a previously identified capability. 
Thus, with reference to the previous possibility distribution example, we might 
have for the Execute function of the Land Combat mission the following: 
Capability Dependency 
Ability to Look 30 km Moderate Importance 
Send Message in 5 Minutes Essential 
The result of a manual aggregation (or rollup as it is often called) of these two 
capabilities with respect o the mission would be Green. The reason is as 
follows. The capability to Send Message in 5 Minutes is Essential, and the 
possibility that it is Green is 80%. The alternative is only of Moderate 
Importance and has a diffuse possibility distribution peaked at Red/Yellow. 
On the other hand, the dependency linkage for the Monitor function of the 
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same Land Combat mission might look like the following: 
Capability Dependency 
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Ability to Look 30 km Highly Important 
Send Message in 5 Minutes Moderate Importance 
In these circumstances the rollup to the mission level would produce a Red/ 
Yellow or Yellow label depending upon total context. The process continues for 
all levels of combat intensity of Land Combat. Then the next mission is 
considered, for example, Intelligence. Curiously enough, colors can even retreat 
to a greener hue at higher sublevels of combat intensity despite the strong 
dependency on the preceding sublevel. 
We speak metaphorically in referring to our interpretation f the degree to 
which a color is green. However, provision exists for a visual expression of this 
with color graphics if hue is taken as the measure of greenishness or greenish tint 
(admixture). The retreat to a greener color means basically that he higher levels 
of aggregation are being essentially decoupled from their dependence on lower- 
lying levels that would drive us toward red. In a sense the program deliberately 
"forgets" things. This forgetting is the software analog of the decision maker 
who cannot proceed if he or she is enmeshed in detail. 
Everything said about moving to a greener hue could, of course, be said about 
moving to a more reddish ue. Figure 4 provides a schematic view of the color 
aggregation process. 
Fuzzy Aggregation 
The challenge of producing an automated decision aid that would roll up 
hundreds of such capabilities sets into dozens of mission areas was to duplicate 
the results of the manual process in a sufficient number of cases to inspire 
confidence in the tool. 
Having determined the color for the various C3 mission support functions 
[Monitor, Decide, Execute, and Reconstitute (the forces)] from the underlying 
operational capabilities, the next task is to roll across the support functions to 
determine the overall color of the C3 support o the mission itself. (This is the 
horizontal arrow of step 2 in Figure 2). This is done in much the same manner. 
Again the user is asked to define a set of linguistic variables that link the overall 
mission accomplishment to the four functional C3 support areas. Such a set 
might look like the following: 
(LOW-IMPORTANCEI0.5, AVERAGEI0.65, GREAT-IMPORTANCEI0.85 ) 
The result might be like that found in the display following in which we have 
supplied a plausible color label for the Decide function for the Land Combat 
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Figure 4. Schematic lUustration of C3 Capabilities Rolling Up into Mission Sublevels 
by Color and Dependency 
mission. Thus, the whole mission might relate to three of the key subfunctions a  
follows: 
C3 Function Color Dependency 
Monitor Red/Yellow Great Importance 
Decide Yellow Average Importance 
Execute Green Great Importance 
Here we have a problem. Is the result Green or Red/Yellow? To some degree it 
depends upon whether the user is an optimist or a pessimist. Doing the rollup 
manually, the user would probably opt for the Red/Yellow color, particularly 
since there is a possibility that the result could be Red or Yellow for the Monitor 
function. On the other hand, the Execute function is definitely Green and has 
equal weight. The software would have computed the conservative case (Red/ 
Yellow) without additional instructions. At present we have no fuzzy consensus 
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operation built in for instances like these. In any case, this process continues 
until all the various mission functions within all the missions in a theatre have 
been combined. 
The next level of rollup occurs when all the missions that are carried out by a 
theatre commander have been evaluated for a color label. The next level up links 
the missions with the theatre. The drill is the same. Consider a fictitious theatre 
called WESTCOM. We need the dependency links between it and the various 
missions. Something like the following might result. 
Mission Color Dependency 
Land Combat Red/Yellow Essential 
Air Defense Green/Yellow Very Important 
Logistics Yellow Essential 
Naval Air Green Moderate 
Despite the preponderance of favorable colors, the rollup would produce Red/ 
Yellow. 
One step remains: aggregation from theatre/CINC to global level. At this 
point significant external factors enter in. Chief among these are risk assessment 
and political realities. Both may reintroduce the possibility of additional colors 
for theatre readiness. Moreover, they may also influence the degree of 
dependency of the global picture on different heatres. 
While we tolerate it, we do not recommend use of the code to automatically 
roll up to theatre level. We actually prohibit the final level of aggregation 
assessment without reconfirmation of all color possibility values being used. We 
would note parenthetically that there is a reason that we do not recommend 
automatic rollup more than one step at a time. It is because fuzzy data get used 
up, or washed out as it were, when too many fuzzy operations are concatenated. 
Remember that each rollup corresponds toa decision, which ought o reduce the 
level of fuzziness. Instead, our rollup process increases fuzziness. The process 
of washout can be quite swift, sometimes occurring in three to five concatenated 
operations. We were guided in our work by a comparison between automatic 
predictions and those resulting with manual intervention and reconfirmation of
the data. 
Fuzzy Computational Details 
It suffices to sketch one level of aggregation i order to understand the manner 
in which all aggregation was accomplished. For each basic capability that was 
identified as supporting a conflict intensity sublevel of a mission function, a 
matrix was defined. The row labels were the dependencies, and the column 
labels, the seven colors. The matrix is constructed internally and not displayed to 
the user. Entries are possibility distribution point values showing the possibility 
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that a capability is the indicated ependency-color c mbination. Thus, we might 
have the notional matrix in Table 1. No special significance should be attached to 
the fact that 0nly two rows are nonzero. The matrix can be nonzero at any point. 
It is simply that our users usually filled in only one row, more rarely two. At 
times it was difficult to prevent hem from entering only a single point value 
somewhere in the matrix. 
A separate matrix is constructed by the software from the color-dependency 
combinations solicited from the user for each conflict intensity sublevel of the 
mission function supported by the indicated capability. Similar matrices can be 
constructed for the other capabilities supporting the designated mission function. 
The initial version of the program then performs a fuzzy disjunction (union) 
using the MAX operation on the matrices appropriate to a selected conflict 
intensity sublevel of a mission function. Computationally, this corresponds to 
selecting the maximum value for each row-column entry (ij). Thus, where 
N= CIUC2U "'" Cp, 
ni j=MAX [c•k:k= 1, p] 
But N is only an intermediate matrix result, sincc the row labels are themselves a 
fuzzy set. Kaufmann [4] calls this a conditioned fuzzy matrix. In order to get the 
final result, the fuzzy set corresponding tothe row labels must be combined with 
N. Formally, the operation is represented asfollows. We have for each element 
in the resultant row matrix My for the selected mission function for a given 
conflict intensity sublevel (where D is the row matrix of dependency labels), 
mA = MAX 1 [MIN [ dl i, nik]] k E [color set] 
One last step remains. A projection operator is applied to Myto get the largest 
value entry. The resultant color is the label associated with that entry. In 
practice, ties were common. To break the ties, a screen prompt asked the user to 
declare whether she or he was a pessimist or optimist. If a pessimist, the color 
label closest o red was chosen; if an optimist, the label closest o green. 
At this stage in the computation, the program has rolled up one set of 
capabilities that support a conflict intensity sublevel for a single function of one 
Table 1. Matrix for Capability C1 






. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
0 0 0 .30 .85 .45 0 
0 .90 .80 0 0 0 0 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
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mission in a theatre for one war posture and one of the two budgetary horizons. 
Some numbers are instructive at this point. For a total iteration there are 
4 to 7 capabilities for each of 4 to 6 conflict intensity sublevels of 3 to 4 
mission functions for each of 7 to 10 missions for each of 10 theatres for each 
of 4 war postures for each of 2 budgetary horizons 
We estimate that this results in some 1000,000 possible combinations, which is 
in itself a powerful argument for using approximate r asoning technique to avoid 
combinatorial explosion. 
The next step is to complete all three (four) mission subfunctions for all 
mission conflict intensity sublevels. In order to achieve rollup across the 
functions at the same hierarchy level, a matrix is constructed for each mission 
sublevel using the row matrix Mfjust discussed as input. The columns are again 
the colors, and the rows are the new dependencies appropriate to the relation 
being aggregated. The process may be either manual or automatic. If automatic, 
all the entries from any row matrix Mf form a row in a new matrix My similar to 
that introduced for the capabilities but with (usually) different row labels. Unless 
filled in by hand, the new matrix My has zeros in all rows but one. 
r mn. i= selected ependency, with j and k E [color set] 
myiJ= l 0"~ i~:selected dependency, with j and k E [color set] 
The process then proceeds as before by rolling across My for each stiblevel of the 
mission for each mission. The end result for each mission is another row matrix. 
These then become the building blocks for rollup to theatre level. These repeated 
sequences of disjunctive operations on the same data, which are part of the 
automatic aggregation, are responsible for the washout phenonmena already 
mentioned. 
FIELD EXPERIENCE WITH THE PROGRAM CODE 
Testing and Fielding 
The program was written to satisfy what is called an "urgent mission 
requirement." Translated, this meant hat development and field test went hand 
in hand because of the extremely short time frame from conception to 
implementation, about 3 months. The program went out to all 10 CINCs/theatres 
worldwide for use by local staff. In all instances a team of coworkers, who were 
actually charged with conduct of the Performance Assessment Report (as 
opposed to the methodological aspects described in this contribution), accompa- 
nied the developing code. They worked directly with local staff officers in the 
field to build the data base and to produce aggregations through theatre level that 
were agreeable to the local staff. 
266 John Dockery and Edward Murray 
Back in Washington, additional work in aggregation was performed by a local 
contractor using the data base gathered in the field. The final level of 
aggregation from the theatre level to the national assessment level was done both 
manually and automatically, but in both instances with a new set of input data. 
Our basic confidence comes from users who agree that the program is producing 
results in accord with their basic understanding of how the aggregation process 
should work. At times the program results have initially been rejected but after 
further consideration the user has agreed with them. 
User Response to the Code 
The original program code had two sets of users: those who were internal to 
OJCS, and those external. Most external users tolerated the code as an intrusion 
on their normal activities. Internally, OJCS users and their contractor liked the 
program. They were troubled only in passing about references to fuzzy sets, as 
the mathematics was totally transparent. Some considerable xplanation did 
attach to the idea of possibility as opposed to probability. Field users never 
picked more than one possible dependency choice. Moreover, many specified 
only one color as being possible but hedged their bets at the 70% level. Thus, 
much of our basic input data were crisper than we had anticipated. It was 
probably this fact alone that permitted the extensive automated concatenation f 
fuzzy operations. 
ADDITIONAL PROGRAM FEATURES 
Basic Information About the Code 
The program is currently written in Basic. (It is being rewritten in Pascal.) 
The choice was dictated by the fact that a rapid prototype, based on existing 
subroutines to generate screen displays, was available. Practical considerations 
such as the availability of the compiler for desk-top computers were also a 
factor. During sessions the user is guided through the software by a sequence of 
nested menu screens. A highly schematic functional view of the program is 
presented in Figure 5. 
Displays are in the form of bar graphs for each rollup level. The bars are 
segmented by intensity conflict sublevels and portray the appropriate color for 
each segment. A user's manual is also available [5]. 
Use of the Optional Disjunctives 
In fuzzy set theory there exist hierarchies of connectives that may themselves 
be used to model the decision process. In our software, one program screen does 
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Overall Functional Schematic of Aggregation Program Software. 
offer a limited choice of fuzzy disjunctions since only disjunctives were used in 
this version. In a sense the options model the strength of various aggregation 
combinations. 
Using only disjunctions produced a one-dimensional view of the decision 
maker that worked surprisingly well. The choices of connective were taken from 
duBois and Prade [61, who discuss a very rich variety of fuzzy operators. The 
screen options are all weaker disjunctions; their use also serves as a kind of 
rough sensitivity analysis. If the color does not change as the choice of 
connective is varied, we count the result as robust. 
One connective in particular is interesting because it contains a variable 3, 
(gamma) that sweeps over the range of several other disjunctions and is called a 
compensatory operator. It is ultimately due to Hammacher [7]. For two 
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membership point values x, y we have 
f(x, y) _x + y -xy -  (1 - 7)xY 
7 + (1 - 7 ) ( I  -xy) 
The definition is recursive; thus for three point values, 
f(x, y, z) =f[f(x, y), z] =f[x, f(y, z)], etc. 
Gamma may take values from zero to infinity. Users are permitted to input their 
own value for 7, which gives them some sense of control. What they do not 
know, however, unless they read the user's manual very closely is this: Gamma 
introduces the maximum variation between 0 and 1; most of the remainder of the 
variation occurs between 1 and 2. Most users input large values up to 100, the 
current limit. Our tacit assumption is that approximate r asoning is nonlinear 
anyway in dealing with numerical estimates. In understanding the role of this 
compensated operator and its range of values, we have taken a leaf from the 
counting system in Pidgin English; "one-fella, two-fella, many-fella". It seems 
adequate for them and for us as well. 
Linking to Program Deficiencies 
Whenever a capability is judged to be some color other than green, a reason is 
sought. The cause is usually in the form of some kind of perceived eficiency in 
current processes or equipment. To remove the deficiency requires ome action, 
which often takes the form of a budgetary line item program. One feature of the 
code is that it keeps track of which deficiencies have some bearing on the 
national assessment. Only those capabilities that are vital to the support of 
essential missions usually survive the aggregation process, although there can be 
surprises. Users may challenge the results by experimenting with the connec- 
tives or by altering the basic color-dependency input combinations. If they 
succeed in changing the color, they will obtain a new fuzzy audit trail which 
usually lead to a new set of budgetary line items. 
RESULTS AND OBSERVATIONS 
Fuzzy set theory is valuable as a modeling tool for automating approximate 
reasoning problems. It can be said to have done the following for us" 
9 Reduced the data requirements to two types: an estimate of the capability 
expressed as the possibility that it was a certain color and the dependency of
the higher aggregation levels on that capability 
9 Communicated to the user in terminology he or she readily used and 
understood, such as colors 
9 Replicated a heuristic decision-making process using only a very limited 
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data set and a bare minimum of fuzzy operations, compared with the 
manual process. 
Viewed in terms of its effect on the management of the effectiveness 
evaluation process, the use of an automated program had some interesting 
consequences. It did at least the following: 
9 Centralized, and returned to the military staff in the Pentagon, the 
fundamental judgmental aspects of the warfighting capability aggregation 
process 
9 Permitted ata gathered from diverse sources to be standardized 
9 Provided the same paradigm for all CINCs used for aggregation if they so 
chose; and even if they did not, permitted the OJCS decision makers to 
replicate their results using a standard paradigm 
9 "Quantized" the budgetary process being driven by the aggregation 
process 
The last entry deserves some amplification. By "quantized" we mean that there 
was no longer a linear relation between dollars added to the budget and color 
change as in the usual case. Instead, all contributions to the color (other than 
green) that the program had identified as "drivers" had to be ameliorated before 
any change could occur. Thus, by conventional budget wisdom, it is not possible 
to have 80% of the program total green and 20% red and still roll up to red. 
Likewise it is improbable at best that with 80% of the programs red and only 
20% green the rollup would be green. Yet that is exactly what this exercise in 
automated approximate r asoning produced. 
The document this methodology helped produce is actually being used as 
decision input for the JCS. It is not a toy program. The observations reported 
here are taken from field use by military staffdecision makers. The most general 
conclusion that we wish to draw concerns the kind of data used. It seems that the 
closer the methodology comes to using the actual field data, the better the result. 
This lesson is often forgotten when the data are linguistic. 
FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 
Experimentation with More Complex Combinations of Connectives 
The original program used only disjunctive operations corresponding to fuzzy 
AND/OR. The user could vary the strength of the connectives a  outlined above. 
However, conjunctives corresponding to fuzzy AND and combinations such as 
[(AND, AND, AND) OR (AND, AND)] were not permitted. We had surprising 
luck with disjunctions alone. We had not expected such success. People who had 
previously done the process manually indicated that they usually talked in terms 
like A AND B AND SOME OF C. It may be that introduction of the 
dependencies took care of this effect o a first order. 
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It has become apparent that when the program is used in an interactive mode 
in which the user is seeking aparticular aggregated color change, a richer menu 
of connectives might produce the desired result. This will require the addition of 
automatic features that shuffle through the combinations, and also a facility to 
permit he user to specify more complex combinations. The addition of expert 
system features has also been suggested. 
Introduction of GoaI-Direcled Artificial Inlelligence Techniques 
The addition of AI techniques represents only a small modification. Buried 
in this problem is a much more significant application of AI to approximate 
reasoning. We sketch it in closing. While the program code discussed here 
performed the aggregation upward from information on capabilities through 
intervening levels to a national assessment, the equally important downward 
path through the same hierarchy from national goals to identification of the 
needed capabilities was not automated. (See Figure 1.) There remains a 
laborious initial step to identify the lowest-lying capabilities. While national 
goals change slowly, the goals of the CINCs and the missions planners that 
support hem change more rapidly as they seek to respond to national goals in a 
changing environment. For this application we are exploring the application of 
backward chaining over the four hierarchical levels. 
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